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Abstract
In this note the concept of solidarity value in cooperative game theory is discussed.
The value proposed by Nowak & Radzik is analyzed in terms of shifts of c-diagrams.
The value is shown to be equal to the Shapley value for a shifted game. A general
approach to a theory of solidarity is developed in terms of ”keep” and ”give” vectors.
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1 Introduction
We consider a cooperative game (N,v), where N is the set of n players. S ⊆ N is called a
coalition, where S = ∅ is usually excluded. v is a mapping of S on a real number v(S), that
is usually taken to be non-negative. v(S) is called the worth of S. The worth v(N) of the
grand coalition N is usually to be allocated to the n players in such a way that, if player i
is allocated xi, then
∑n
i=1 xi = v(N). Such an allocation is called efficient.
The distribution of v(N) over the n players is usually based on the worths v(S) of the
coalitions. A solution concept for the distribution is usually some expression in terms of the
v(S). The best known of the unique solution concepts, called values, is that of Shapley [5]. If
mi(S) = v(S)− v(S − i),
the marginal contribution of i to S, then, with | S |= s,
xi =
∑
S3i
(n−s)!(s−1)!
n!
mi(S)
1
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Figure 1: v-diagram and c-diagram of a 3-player cooperative game
is the allocation, according to the Shapley value.
Note that for a solution concept the v(S), S 6= N , need not play a role. If xi =
v(N)
n
, for
all i ∈ N , we have an efficient allocation too, which is called the egalitarian value.
As is clear from the many times we wrote the word ”usually”, various different frame-
works may be considered. The described framework, however, is that for the solidarity
value introduced by Nowak & Radzik [4].
They replaced the marginal contribution mi(S) in the expression for the Shapley value
by
Av(S) = 1
s
∑
j∈S mj(S),
so by the average contribution for the players belonging to the coalition S.
For characterization of the Shapley value, unanimity games (N, uS) can be used, de-
fined as
uS(T ) = 1, if T ⊇ S and uS(T ) = 0, otherwise.
The map v of a cooperative game (N,v) can be expressed as
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S,T 6=∅ c(uT ),
where
c(uS) =
∑
T⊆S,T 6=∅(−1)
s−tv(T ), t =| T |.
These numbers c(uS), which we will denote by cS, have a relationship to the numbers
v(S), which we will denote by vS, that is very clearly illustrated by socalled diagrams.
The partially ordered set of coalitions S, now including the empty coalition S = ∅ , has
a Hasse-diagram, which may be used to indicate all vS, in a v-diagram and all cS, in a
c-diagram, see Figure 1.
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The numbers cS give a much clearer picture of the game (N,v). Also the formulae may
become much simpler. The Shapley value in terms of the c’s reads
xi =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
1
s
cS.
The number cS is equally distributed over the players in S.
The author [3] introduced set games, where the worth of a coalition is a subset of a
universe U of elements. Bumb and Hoede [1] showed that there is a natural relationship
between a cooperative game and set games in the sense that with the cooperative game a
standard set game can be associated. The universe of that standard set game has elements
uS, for all S ⊆ N , and the relationship is expressed by associating a number cS with each
element uS of the universe U. The numerical relationship is precisely that already described
for game and unanimity games.
Again, usually additivity of games is considered, which for the c-diagrams means that
one can focus on a diagram with only one cS being, possibly, non-zero. Such a c-diagram
corresponds to a game where v(N) = cS. Note that v(S) is the sum of all cS∗, with S
∗ ⊆ S,
so from this game v(N) gets contribution cS, next to many contributions zero. The same
holds for v(T) with T ⊇ S, of course.
As v(N), for the given game (N,v), is to be distributed over the n players, this means that,
after decomposing the game according to its c-diagram into 2N − 1 games, each cS is to be
distributed over the n players. In what follows we will focus on the distribution of cS over
the n players.
2 Solidarity value and shifts
As the solidarity value is expressed in the marginal contributions mi, which are expressed
in the vS’s, which are, on their turn, expressed in the cS’s we may express the solidarity
value in terms of the cS’s.
An arbitrary solution concept will not yield an expression that is linear in the cS’s,
although any specific solution, explicit allocation, that is efficient, distributes v(N) over
the n players in such a way that each player gets a specific part of cS. Hence such a specific
solution can be written as
xi =
∑
S⊆N λS,icS, with
∑n
i=1 λS,i = 1.
The solidarity value of Nowak & Radzik is expressable in a linear way in terms of the
cS’s, due to the fact that the marginal contributions are. However, the resulting expression
is not a simple one. One finds, after tedious calculations, that
xi =
∑
T3i
1
t
[1− a1(n, t)]/
(
n
t
)
]cT +
∑
T 63i
1
t+1
[1− a2(n, t)]/
(
n
t+1
)
]cT ,
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where
a1(n, t) =
∑n−t
k=0
k
k+t
(
k+t−1
k
)
, and
a2(n, t) =
∑n−t−1
k=0
k+1
k+t+1
(
k+t
k
)
.
Unlike for the Shapley value, where everything condenses to
xi =
∑
T3i
1
t
cT ,
the expressions a1(n, t) and a2(n, t) are not so tractable.
However, we have another goal. The concept of shift of a c-diagram was introduced by
Bumb and Hoede [2]. The basic idea is that v(N) =
∑
T⊆N cT and that this represents a
way to distribute v(N) over the coalitions. A shift is any redistribution of v(N) over the
coalitions. A c-diagram is therewith transformed into a c∗-diagram with v(N) =
∑
T⊆N c
∗
T .
The c∗-diagram obtained by shifting determines a cooperative game (N, v∗). Bumb
and Hoede give examples of shifts where the Shapley value for (N, v∗) gives the same
allocation as for (N,v). In fact, given any efficient solution concept a specific solution
x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) for a game (N,v) may in a trivial way be obtained as the Shapley value
of a shifted game (N, v∗). We simply put c∗i = xi, for i = 1,...,n, and all other cT equal
to 0. The efficiency implies
∑n
i=1 xi = v(N) and hence
∑
T⊆N cT = v(N) for this extreme
form of shifting. Applying the Shapley value to the c∗-diagram recovers the solution x.
We will show that for the solidarity value there is a special shift such that the allocation
by the solidarity value is equal to the allocation by the Shapley value of the shifted diagram.
Consider the contribution from the grand coalition to the allocation to a player, using
the solidarity value. A specific marginal contribution mi(N) can be expressed in the cS’s
and we find
mi(N) =
∑
T⊆N,T3i cT .
Calculating 1
n
∑
i∈N mi(N), as we must for the solidarity value, gives an expression in
terms of the cS’s. If s is the cardinality of all coalitions S with s players, the expression
consists of terms of the form
s
n
∑
S⊆N,|S|=s
cS, (1)
i.e. each player gets such a contribution to Av in the solidarity value formula. This
motivates the choice of the shift. Given a c-diagram for (N,v) we shift to a c∗-diagram where
4
c∗S =
1(
n
s
)
∑
S⊆N,|S|=s
cS. (2)
This simply means that in the c-diagram layerwise the numbers cS have been made
equal to their average.
Theorem 1 The solidarity value for a game (N,v) with corresponding c-diagram gives
an allocation that is equal to that given by the Shapley value of the game (N, v∗) corre-
sponding to the c∗-diagram obtained by Formula 2.
Proof For the grand coalition itself we have
c∗N =
1
(nn)
∑
S⊆N,|S|=n cS = cN ,
by construction of the shift. The combinatorial factor is
(n−n)!(n−1)!
n!
= 1
n
.
In the case of the Shapley value the marginal contribution is given by
mi(N) =
∑
T⊆N,T3i c
∗
T .
In the case of the solidarity value, the value of AvN is found as sum of expressions in
Formula 1, namely
AvN =
∑n
s=1
s
n
∑
s⊆N,|S|=s cS.
We will show that these numbers are equal. Let us focus on coalitions of cardinality s,
s < n. For a player i, there are
(
n
s
)
s-tuples in total,
(
n−1
s−1
)
of which occur in mi(N). Their
corresponding c∗S are all expressed in the cS’s by Formula 2. So this contribution to mi(N) is
(
n−1
s−1
)
. 1
(ns)
∑
S⊆N,|S|=s cS =
s
n
∑
S⊆N,|S|=s cS.
But this is precisely the same contribution as to Av(N). Thus mi(N) = A
v(N).
For other coalitions than the grand coalition, one shows in a completely analogous way
that mi(S) for the game (N, v
∗) is equal to Av(S) for the game (N,v). As the combinatorial
factors are the same all the time, the result follows. 2
Example
For N = 1,2,3,4 the solidarity value allocates to each player the average of the marginal
contributions that are:
Player 1: c1234 + c123 + c124 + c134 + c12 + c13 + c14 + c1
Player 2: c1234 + c123 + c124 + c234 + c12 + c23 + c24 + c2
Player 3: c1234 + c123 + c134 + c234 + c13 + c23 = c34 + c3
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Player 4: c1234 + c124 + c134 + c234 + c14 + c24 + c34 + c4,
weighted with the factor 1
n
= 1
4
. So Av(N) is
4
4
(c1234)+
3
4
(c123 +c124+c134+c234)+
2
4
(c12 +c13+c14+c23+c24+c34)+
1
4
(c1 +c2+c3+c4),
for players 1,2,3 and 4.
For player 1, using the Shapley value for the shifted game, we have
m1(N) = c
∗
1234 + c
∗
123 + c
∗
124 + c
∗
134 + c
∗
12 + c
∗
13 + c
∗
14 + c
∗
1.
As c∗1234 = c1234, c
∗
123 = c
∗
124 = c
∗
134 =
1
4
(c123 + c124 + c134 + c234), c
∗
12 = c
∗
13 = c
∗
14 =
c∗23 + c
∗
24 + c
∗
34 =
1
6
(c12 + c13 + c14 + c23 + c24 + c34), c
∗
1 = c
∗
2 = c
∗
3 = c
∗
4 =
1
4
(c1 + c2 + c3 + c4),
we find
m1 = c1234 + 3.
1
4
(c123 + c124 + c134 + c234) + 3.
1
6
(c12 + c13 + c14 + c23 + c24 + c34) +
1
4
(c1 +
c2 + c3 + c4),
which is equal to Av(N), as are m2(N), m3(N) and m4(N).
Note for the coalitions S, with s=2, that in the case of the Shapley value the coefficient
is 3.1
6
, where 3 =
(
4−1
1
)
and 6 =
(
4
2
)
, whereas in the case of the solidarity value the coeffi-
cient is 2.1
4
, where 2 is the value of s and 4 is the value of n. However, as we have seen, in
general we have
(
n−1
s−1
)
for the number of terms corresponding with coalitions of cardinality
s, whereas the averaging is over
(
n
s
)
coalitions. So the coefficient becomes
(
n−1
s−1
)
/
(
n
s
)
= s
n
in the case of the Shapley value. This is precisely the coefficient for the solidarity value,
where coalitions of cardinality s occur as indices for each of the s players in that coalition in
the averaging process and n is the cardinality of the coalition for which Av(N) is calculated
and therefore describes the averaging. 
The result poses an interesting general problem. Given some efficient solution concept
for a game (N,v), is there any non-trivial shift to a game (N, v∗), so that the value given
by the solution concept can be calculated by the Shapley value of the shifted game?
3 A general approach to solidarity
The solidarity value of Nowak & Radzik was shown to be expressible in the numbers cS
in a linear way, although the expression was, by far, not as simple as that for the Shapley
value. However, one may start the discussion on solidarity by focusing on how the number
cS is distributed over the n players of the game. This was the approach of Bumb and
Hoede [2], who described two infinite families of solidarity values, different in nature from
that given by Nowak & Radzik. As these were families, with a floating parameter σ, called
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solidarity, that took values in [0,1], no characterization was given. However, there is a way
to come to a unique value from first principles, which we will describe now.
The principles are that each player may exhibit solidary behaviour or not, the solidarity
not necessarily being the same for all players. The distribution of some cS over all players
may be modelled in several ways.
We start by introducing two vectors k = (k1, k2, ..., kn) and g = (g1, g2, ..., gn), called keep
vector and give vector respectively, where 0 ≤ gi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ ki ≤ 1, gi + ki = 1 for all i ∈ N .
A player i with ki = 1 is considered not to be inclined to give away something and may be
called an egoist. A player j with gj = 1 is considered to give away everything and may be
called an altruist. In general, players will have some less extreme values for their keep and
give numbers.
When now the distribution of some cS is considered, we first remark that if ki = 1 for
all i ∈ S, under the assumption of equal treatment, we would distribute in equal parts cS
s
.
This then would give the Shapley value. All players are egoists! The player i with keep
number smaller than 1 is assumed to ”give away” gi.
cS
s
to players outside S. So of cS the
players in S keep
K(S) =
∑s
i=1 ki
cS
s
,
whereas they give away
G(S) =
∑s
i=1 gi
cS
s
.
The question now is how the amount given away by the players of S is distributed over
the other n-s players. There are three clear possible ways. First, also the amount G(S) is
distributed according to the keep numbers. Second, the amount G(S) is distributed evenly
over the other players. Third, the amount is distributed according to the give numbers.
The latter means that altruistic players are rewarded for their giving away certain parts
having a larger share of all that is given away by coalitions to which they do not belong.
In terms of the cS’s we obtain the following three ways of allocation:
(a) xi =
∑
S3i ki.
cS
s
+
∑
S 63i
kiPn−s
j=1 kj
.G(S)
(b) xi =
∑
S3i ki.
cS
s
+
∑
S 63i
1
n−s
.G(S)
(c) xi =
∑
S3i ki.
cS
s
+
∑
S 63i
giPn−s
j=1 gj
.G(S).
In case any quotient kiPn−s
j=1 kj
or giPn−s
j=1 gj
is undefined we can take
∑
S3i
1
n−s
.G(S), so
allocate according to solution concept (b).
There is an aspect that we did not yet take into account. The number cS may be
negative. In fact, Bumb and Hoede [2] have splitted the c-diagram into two diagrams, one
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containing the positive cS’s and one containing the negative cS’s. Each diagram determines
a game, respectively a reward game and a fine game. The way to determine the solution
for these games need not be the same. Here something similar occurs.
The egoist might want to avoid a negative contribution and may therefore be assumed
to use his high keep number as give number in case the number cS is negative. The altruist
may in that case use his high give number as keep number, thus taking a larger blow from
the negativity of cS for the specific S he belongs to. Things like these make the solidarity
value more complicated but are easily included modifications.
4 Characterization
Let us consider case (b) and let us assume that gi = σ for all players. σ will be called the
(personal) solidarity. Then
xi =
∑
S3i(1− σ).
cS
s
+
∑
S 63i
1
n−s
.G(S).
As G(S) =
∑s
i=1 σ.
cS
s
= s.σ. cS
s
= σ.cS , we obtain
xi =
∑
S3i(1− σ).
cS
s
+
∑
S 63i σ.
cS
n−s
.
A value like this can be characterized by the axioms of Additivity and Efficiency to
begin with, as in the case of the Shapley value. However, there the Null Player property
is added to prevent certain players to get a non-zero allocation and the Equal Treatment
property to let , after decomposition into unanimity games, the numbers cS be distributed
equally over the members of S.
As now players outside the coalition get a share of cS, unless σ = 0, we do not pose an
axiom like the Null Player property. In fact, there is a rather basic problem here. Do the
axioms have to be formulated on the level of the game (N,v), or can they be formulated on
the level of the unanimity games (N, uS)? In the latter case, things are much easier as we
then just have to prescribe the way the cS’s are to be distributed in a unique way. A similar
situation occurred for the fine games considered by Bumb and Hoede [2] and Xu, Hoede
and Sun [6]. There next to Additivity and Efficiency the unique way to use a fine vector
f was defined. Here next to Additivity and Efficiency the unique way to use a solidarity
vector g = (σ, σ, ..., σ) is defined. In a sense, for the Shapley value, the combination of
Null Player property and Equal Treatment property does just that, give a unique way to
distribute the cS’s, namely in equal parts to the players in S, which corresponds to our
solidarity value with σ = 0.
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5 Dynamic cooperative games
In cooperative game theory dynamic aspects do not seem to have been considered often.
It is therefore interesting that the developed theory opens up the possibility for including
dynamic aspects.
Any dynamics on the part of k and g, so changes in the personal keep and give vectors,
lead to reallocation. The vectors k(t) and g(t), where t is the time, then lead to a time-
dependent allocation vector x(t). If k(t) and g(t) are seen as policies one might study the
time development of the cooperative game system, for various assumptions about the way
these policies change in reaction to the changing allocation vector x(t). This would lead
to a kind of dynamic cooperative game theory.
In case (a) the altruist will be ”punished” for his solidary attitude. However, in case
(c) he will get some reward. The egoist i, with ki = 1 and gi = 0 only gets his ”Shapley
part” of all the ”pies” cS, S 3 i, but nothing from all that is given away, as the second
term in the allocation (c) becomes zero. The altruist i, with ki = 0 and gi = 1 only gets
an allocation from the second term. Remarkably, if all other players are egoists, then the
altruist is the only one contributing to G(S), but also to receive as only one, thus getting
back what he gave away, according to (c)!
A first, very simple, result can be obtained as follows. Let us consider the time deriva-
tive of xi(t). This leads to an expression in terms of the time derivatives of ki(t) and gi(t)
in case (c). In cases (a) and (b) only the time derivative of ki(t) occurs. Let us also assume
that the numbers cS are positive in order to keep things simple. Then xi can be enlarged
by enlarging ki in the cases (a) and (b). This means that the egoists policy will be to
increase his keep number, if not already maximum, i.e. equal to 1.
In case (c) however, altruists get a larger share of what is given away, there is an inter-
esting phenomenon. As ki(t) + gi(t) = 1, we have that
dgi(t)
dt
= −dki(t)
dt
. So
dxi(t)
dt
= dki(t)
dt
[
∑
S3i
cS
s
−
∑
S 63i
cS
n−s
].
Now xi may increase too, but the policy may now be to decrease the keep number! This
depends on the expression between brackets. If positive, ki must be increased, but when
negative it pays off for i to decrease his keep number, i.e. increase his give number. This
happens in a substantial altruistic surrounding. The critical point for this phenomenon of
changing is when
∑
S3i
cS
s
=
∑
S 63i
cS
n−s
.
The result is rather familiar. In an egoistic surrounding the best is to be egoistic oneself.
Only in an altruistic surrounding the tendency for player i to become altruistic too, based
on the egoistic wish to raise xi, may occur. The only way to induce such behaviour seems
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to be to introduce a special altruistic player a with cS, S = a, so large that the expression
between brackets becomes negative. A ruler spending a lot on his people might make his
people develop the mentality to become altruistic too! Unfortunately such rulers are not
met frequently!!
As a final remark this should be mentioned. The process of keeping and giving reminds
one of an economic market and the description in terms of shifts of c-diagrams might be
seen as reallocation of worths. This seems to provide a way to obtain a theory of economics
in terms of dynamic cooperative game theory.
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